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On the first of September 1999, the President designate of the 
European Commission, Professor Romano Prodi, invited Mr. Jean-Luc 
Dehaene, former Prime Minister of Belgium, Mr. Richard von 
Weizsacker, former President of the Federal Republic of Germany and 
Lord Simon of Highbury, former chairman of British Petroleum and 
former Minister, to give their views in complete independence, by mid 
October, on the institutional implications of enlargement in view of the 
forthcoming Intergovernmental Conference. 
The mandate of the group was to identify institutional problems which 
needed to be tackled and to present arguments indicating why they 
needed to be dealt with by the IGC. It was not to make specific 
proposals: this will be the task of the Member States and of the 
institutions, before and during the IGC. 
The group met several times m September and October under the 
chairmanship of Mr. Dehaene. 
It presented its report on October 181h. 
2 
1. Introductory Remarks: The Challenge 
1.1 Reform is urgent 
The institutional structure of the European Union was established in the fifties 
for a Community of six Member States. It was a very original construction and 
it has served Europe well. It is largely due to the institutions that political, 
social and economic relations between the states and societies of Western 
Europe have been fundamentally transformed in a balanced and peaceful 
manner. The basic elements ofthis structure must obviously be maintained. 
But there are now clear indications that the system is no longer working as it 
should in a Union of fifteen members. The question automatically arises 
whether the institutions, as initially conceived, will be able to serve efficiently 
a Union which may in the foreseeable future extend to 25 - 30 or even more 
participants. Since the fifties, successive treaties have introduced some 
adaptations of the institutional framework, but there has been no effort at 
comprehensive reform. This is a challenge we will sooner or later have to face. 
Member States are in agreement on this point. When signing the Amsterdam 
treaty they accepted the necessity, in due course, of a comprehensive 
institutional reform enabling an enlarged Community to perform efficiently. 
This agreement is embodied in a protocol annexed, in Amsterdam, to the 
European treaties. 
This protocol envisaged a two step approach: a limited reform before the first 
enlargement, a comprehensive reform before the number of Member States 
exceeded twenty. 
Positive developments in the accession process, since Amsterdam, have 
blurred this distinction. Negotiations are being pursued with six candidate 
countries and the Helsinki European Council is likely to initiate negotiations 
with a further group. This means that the first enlargement might well bring 
the Union membership beyond twenty, and that, in any case, the time span 
between the first enlargement and the second would be shorter than initially 
projected. Given this evolution, which may well accelerate in the coming 
months, the group concluded that the spirit of the Amsterdam protocol, the 
needs of the institutional system of the Union and the difficulties inherent in a 
limited agenda implied that an effort at comprehensive reform should be 
undertaken right now. There might be no better occasion in future. 
1.2 Enlargement is Imperative 
There is also agreement among Member States that enlargement is an 
objective of such political and historical importance, both for the Union and 
candidate countries, that it cannot be delayed or postponed because 
institutional reform is incomplete. The challenge for the present generation of 
European leaders is to attain the fundamental objective of enlargement while 
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also resolving, in the same time frame, one of its consequences, namely the 
need for such reform as will enable an enlarged Union to perform effectively. 
The Cologne European Council considered that, in order not to delay 
enlargement, it was necessary for the forthcoming IGC to be concluded by the 
end of 2000. The group has taken that deadline as imperative. 
1.3 The Challenge 
The challenge therefore is to identify those elements of reform that are 
necessary and to indicate the means whereby they could be addressed in the 
year 2000. 
On the first point - the elements of reform - the group noted that the three 
issues identified at Cologne had implications or consequences going well 
beyond the apparent simplicity of their formulation. It advises a somewhat 
broader agenda, including a reorganisation of the treaty texts in order to avoid 
constant revisions. 
On the second point - the means to achieve reform - it suggests that, drawing 
on the lessons from Amsterdam, the IGC negotiating procedure should be 
adapted and that the resulting acceleration could, if the political determination 
was sufficient, produce a more substantial reform package within the 
prescribed deadline. 
1.4 Connecting with the people 
In the course of its work the group has discussed the necessity of more 
simplicity and clarity in the governance of European affairs, more 
transparency, flexibility and accountability in the way the institutions work. 
The fact that most Europeans do not understand the working of our institutions 
must surely be a problem governments should consider. This is not directly 
linked to enlargement, though of course the citizens of new Member States 
will be even more puzzled than those of Member States who have lived 
through half a century of European integration. We must find ways of 
connecting or reconnecting to the people: why and how the institutions 
work and to whom they are accountable must be demystified. 
Transparency implies clarity and public understanding of aims and objectives. 
With this in mind the "Millennium Declaration" which the Finnish presidency 
is preparing for the Helsinki European Council is significant. Language 
approved in that declaration might usefully be introduced in a preamble to the 
forthcoming treaty. 
Similarly the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which is 
called for by the Cologne European Council conclusions, would enhance in 
public opinion the legitimacy and relevance of the institutions. As the 
European Council indicates the question whether and, if so, how the Charter 
should be integrated into the treaties will have to be considered. 
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The reorganisation of the treaties, proposed in this report, would, as a side 
effect, contribute to that simplicity and clarity which is needed to make the 
whole more understandable. Similar efforts could be made to clarify the 
elaboration of secondary law and of the budget. As a minimum, negotiators 
should, in the process of institutional reform, keep the important objectives of 
clarity, simplicity and transparency in mind . 
Clarity and public understanding also implies, in the long term, that Member 
States will have to take a position on the ultimate geographical extension of 
the Union. The Group does not suggest that this should be done now, but the 
problem should not be forgotten. 
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2. Efficiency of the Institutions 
2.1 Reasons for Change 
It is a fact that the institutional structure of the Union has, in recent years, 
shown signs of strain. Everyone acknowledges that the Council is not working 
well: sluggish decision making, lengthy debates, lack of co-ordination between 
too many different Councils, numerous operational and legislative problems 
sent for decision to the heads of Government inhibiting their focus on strategic 
leadership. 
The efficiency of the institutional process has also clearly been hindered by 
the unsatisfactory performance of the Commission. Management weaknesses, 
analysed in a controversial report by independent experts, have been 
acknowledged by the Commission 
The European Parliament itself has seen its powers increase through 
successive treaties but is not making a commensurate impact, as an elected 
assembly should, on public opinion. 
The balance between institutions, which is an essential element of stability and 
efficiency in the system, is also being put under pressure 
A significant increase in the number of participants automatically increases 
problems of decision making and management. Interests are more different, 
discussion is slower, decision more difficult, management more complex. 
Problems in the working of the European institutions are already apparent 
today, and are affecting the functioning of the basic institutional triangle: 
Commission, Council, and Parliament. They are bound to increase. 
Institutional reform is needed to remedy those problems. 
The necessity of reform, as recognised by the treaty of Amsterdam, led the 
Cologne European Council to indicate three issues which clearly need to be 
considered: size and composition of the Commission, weighting of votes in 
Council (including re-weighting, double majority and threshold of qualified 
majority), extension of majority voting. The group believes that discussion of 
these issues can not be handled in isolation. Firstly because they cover in fact 
more topics than is immediately apparent. For example, extension of co-
decision with Parliament is generally seen as a democratic consequence of the 
extension of majority voting. Secondly because the arguments leading to the 
choice of these issues are also valid in other cases. For example the 
Commission is obviously not the only institution where the number of 
members will create problems. 
The issues identified by the European Council are clearly of major importance 
but they need to be considered in the context of a more extensive institutional 
reform. 
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In a larger and more diverse Union, flexibility in the institutional framework is 
even more important than at present. Enlargement will increase diversity. This 
does not imply that Member States should be allowed to opt out of any policy 
they choose: the European Union would not survive if Member States were 
allowed to pick and choose among obligations of the Union. But it does imply 
that, in a more heterogeneous aggregate of Member States, some will wish to 
go further or faster than others. They will want to build on the Union's agreed 
common policies, objectives and achievements. They will therefore wish to 
pursue forms of closer co-operation between themselves. This seems both 
legitimate and indispensable. 
In the absence of such a possibility, Member States will tend to co-operate 
outside the Union (Schengen) or outside the institutional framework of the 
Union (Euro 11). Those solutions affect the institutional balance of the Union 
and they deprive the Member States, and their citizens, of the democratic and 
judicial guarantees that an institutional framework provides. 
Flexibility is in no way directed against candidate countries and will not 
impede accession. On the contrary accession negotiations might well be 
accelerated if, on some of the more difficult issues, closer co-operation was 
effectively a practical option. The principle that flexibility initiatives are open 
to all Member States which fulfil the necessary conditions has always been the 
rule in the European Union. If necessary, it should be reaffirmed. 
The efficiency of the representation of the European institutions in external 
relations needs to be considered and enhanced. For several decades capacity to 
act as a major player on the world stage has been one of the driving forces of 
European integration. The forces of globalisation enhance that aspiration. An 
enlarged European Union will have, even more than at present, the capacity, 
and hopefully the will, to be such a major player in a globalised economy. 
That, indeed, should be one of its main goals. 
2.2 Proposals 
2.2.1 The Commission 
Since the conclusion of the Amsterdam treaty negotiation, it is implicitly 
agreed that the European Commission will increase in number in parallel with 
successive enlargements. For understandable reasons most Member States do 
not accept the perspective of a Commission in which their country would not 
be represented. But the Commission is not, and must not become, an assembly 
of national delegates. It is a European institution of great originality, which 
has a crucial role to play both in decision making and in management. It 
therefore needs to remain effective, operational and well respected. The group 
considers that to safeguard these characteristics in a larger body, a 
strengthening of the authority of the President and a clarification of the 
individual responsibility of Commissioners is essential. These two points 
should be addressed in the IGC, in addition to the question of the size and 
composition of the Commission, which is mentioned in the European Council 
conclusions. 
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The authority of the President of the Commission has been increased by the 
treaty of Amsterdam. The group believes that, in order to enable the President 
to cope effectively with an increased membership, it would be advisable to go 
further. He should have more effective influence in the nomination and 
selection of Commissioners. He should be given clear authority to organise, 
co-ordinate and guide the working of the institution. 
Recent events have raised the question of the individual responsibility of 
Commissioners and of reconciling it with the collective responsibility of the 
Commission. President Prodi is dealing with this in an informal manner by 
requesting in advance the agreement of Commissioners to resign if he so 
requires. The group believes that this informal arrangement should be 
formalised in the treaty, so as to confirm the authority of the President, with 
due respect for the collegial character of the Commission. This would also 
clarify the respective powers of Parliament and President regarding the 
performance and tenure of Commissioners. 
2.2.2 Qualified Majority Voting 
The need for qualified majority voting to be the rule in an enlarged Union, if 
decision making is to remain effective, is self-evident. When unanimity is 
required, the risk of blockage increases in due proportion with the number and 
diversity of participants. On the other hand, the experience of the Community 
itself shows that qualified majority voting creates a dynamic decision making 
process, leading to consensus, even if very few votes are effectively taken. 
Extension of majority voting should obviously be applied to Community 
affairs (the first pillar) but it is also significant for the other two pillars. 
The three aspects mentioned by the European Council conclusions ( extension, 
re-weighting and threshold) are linked. Any solution will need to be well 
balanced and calculated to enhance the decision-making capacity of the Union. 
Whenever qualified majority voting applies in legislative matters in the first 
pillar, the group believes that Parliament should have the power of co-
decision. Extension of qualified majority voting in that field should therefore 
imply parallel extension of the co-decision procedure. This is a democratic 
requirement, well suited to an enlarged and therefore potentially more remote 
Union. It would also contribute to the desirable simplification and 
transparency in the decision-making procedures. 
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2.2.3. Reweighting of votes 
The group accepts that proximate enlargement to a large number of mostly 
small or medium-sized countries implies that the relative weight of Member 
States in the decision making process should be reassessed. The issue is 
politically and symbolically important, but the group feels it has no mandate to 
make specific proposals in this respect. 
2.2.4 The Council 
The Council is at the centre of the decision making process of the Union. 
Practically all governments and outside observers acknowledge that it is not 
working well and that, if no change occurs, increased participation is bound to 
further weaken the efficiency of the institution. Many reform proposals are on 
the table, including an important one introduced by the Secretary General of 
the Council (Trumpf-Piris report). Most of these proposals, such as a 
significant reduction of the number of Council formations or an effective co-
ordinating mechanism between Councils, do not necessitate any treaty change 
and the group is convinced that they should be actively pursued in parallel 
with the IGC. Nevertheless time may show that treaty amendments are needed 
to reorganise the role of the presidency, for instance, or to clarify the 
distinction between the legislative and the executive roles of the Council. Such 
amendments could well contribute to more efficiency and to a better public 
understanding of the working of the Council. The possibility of introducing 
them should be left open. 
2.2.5 Parliament 
Article 189 of the treaty establishing the European Community limits to 700 
the number of members of the European Parliament. This effectively protects 
the institution against inflation in numbers as a result of enlargement. It would 
however be useful to establish, before the problem becomes acute, a rule on 
how to allocate seats to Member States once the upper limit is reached. 
Proposals made elsewhere in this report imply a development of the legislative 
role of Parliament through an extension of the co-decision procedure. 
Parliament, like the other institutions should also reconsider its working 
methods so as to maximise clarity and transparency. 
2.2.6 Other Institutions 
An increase in the number of Member States creates problems of size, 
organisation and efficiency in several institutions. This is the case, for 
instance, in the Court of Justice, the Court of Auditors and the Committee of 
Regions. The group does not wish to examine separately the case of each 
institution but believes that Member States should give due consideration to 
the suggestions put forward by the institutions themselves ( for instance, the 
Court of Justice) or by independent committees (such as the Committee of 
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Independent Experts on the reform of the Commission which has suggested 
the appointment of a European Public Prosecutor). 
2.2. 7 External Relations 
The legal situation today is that a focussed representation of European interest 
in global negotiations is only guaranteed when discussions concern trade in 
goods (for instance in the Uruguay Round). The legal capacity for the 
Community to act as a unit in other economic and financial debates on the 
world stage needs to be established; it is a logical consequence of economic 
and financial integration. 
Therefore the question of external representation of the Union, in subjects like 
trade in services or international monetary matters, should be revisited in the 
IGC In this context legal personality of the Union is also an issue. 
2. 2. 8. Flexibility 
The Treaty of Amsterdam introduced the concept of closer co-operation into 
European law. The group is aware that there has been little time and scope for 
its implementation, and that it may be too early to pass judgement on those 
clauses. But the group is also aware that most observers, inside and outside the 
institutions, consider that the treaty clauses are so complex and subject to such 
conditions and criteria that they are unworkable. Given the increased 
importance of institutional flexibility in an enlarged Union, and the fact that 
they may indeed facilitate enlargement, the group considers that they should 
be revisited. 
It should be possible to initiate such a co-operation by qualified majority, or 
super qualified majority, without the possibility of veto by any single Member 
State, but with due respect for the interests of non-participants. Common 
Foreign and Security policy should be included in the scope of closer co-
operation. The process should remain open to all Member States who fulfil the 
necessary conditions. The principle should remain that flexibility is a way of 
building on and strengthening the Union's achievements, not of loosening the 
ties that bind Member States. 
2.3 Implementation 
Given the constraints of timing, the Union should draw conclusions from 
previous experiences and make a serious effort to accelerate the negotiating 
process. The last IGC was launched by the European Council in Turin on the 
29th of March 1996, the first draft proposal for treaty modifications appeared 
on the negotiating table nine months later (51h.December 1996), six months 
after that, the treaty was concluded ( 17'h.June 1997). 
The group believes that the I.C.G. should start with a draft treaty on the table. 
On past experience this could cut by half the length of the conference. 
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Practically all the issues mentioned in this section were discussed in the 
Amsterdam negotiations and have been the subject of extensive academic 
debate since then. The Commission, representing as it does the collective 
interest of the Union, has always had the right to make proposals to 
intergovernmental conferences. In the past the Commission has, in general, 
been cautious in exercising this right. However, given the urgency and the 
scope of the reforms and extensive previous discussion, the group believes that 
the Commission should submit comprehensive and concrete proposals, in the 
form of a draft treaty, right at the beginning of the conference. In present 
circumstances the Commission has a strong obligation to make full use of its 
right to submit proposals to the Intergovernmental Conference. Obviously the 
Commission would need to work in close contact with other institutions of the 
Union before formulating those proposals. 
As indicated above, the group is well aware that many of the problems facing 
the institutions can be settled without treaty changes. For other problems that 
is not the case and, in view of its mandate, the group's report concentrates on 
these. But adaptation to enlargement should be seen as a single task of 
fundamental importance, whether or not it implies treaty change. Both 
Council and Commission have ongoing procedures oriented towards internal 
reform, largely motivated by the perspective of enlargement. The group 
believes that the two exercises (IGC and reform that does not imply treaty 
changes) should be conducted in parallel, as part of a single effort, and within 
the same time frame . It notes that many changes go against long established 
practices and vested interests. In view of these difficulties, the European 
Council should give a clear mandate requiring a package of significant reforms 
which do not imply treaty change to be agreed by the end of next year, 
together with the results of the IGC, so as to make a comprehensive reform 
effective. 
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3. Reorganisation of treaty texts 
3.1 Reasons for Change 
The group believes that significant change needs to be introduced in the way 
legal texts which are presently in treaty form can, in future , be modified. That 
change should be based on a distinction in the nature of the clauses in the 
present treaties. 
For the past ten or fifteen years the Union has lived through a permanent 
process of treaty modification. At any given moment we have been either 
preparing or negotiating or ratifying treaty changes. The present situation is 
typical: the treaty of Amsterdam entered into force on May 151.and, on June 41\ 
the Cologne European Council called for a new intergovernmental conference. 
Constant treaty revision is a source of political difficulties in several member 
countries of the present Union. It contributes to the feeling of legal insecurity, 
to the fear of constant new interventions and progressive centralisation, which, 
rightly or wrongly, is present in significant sectors of public opinion. It cannot 
be right to pursue this course in an enlarged Union, when each treaty change 
will have to go through 25 or more parliamentary systems with the foreseeable 
delays, frustrations and risks of complete paralysis. 
3.2 Proposals 
The group suggests that present treaty texts should be divided in two separate 
parts: 
• The basic treaty would only include the aims, principles and general policy 
orientations, citizen's rights and the institutional framework. These 
clauses, as is the case now, could only be modified unanimously, through 
an IGC, with ratification by each Member State. Presumably such 
modifications would be infrequent. 
• A separate text ( or texts) would include the other clauses of the present 
treaties, including those which concern specific policies. These could be 
modified by a decision of the Council (acting on the basis of a new super-
qualified majority or on unanimity, depending on the subjects) and the 
assent of the European Parliament (eventually with a special majority). 
Such a change would have the following advantages: 
• greatly reduce the present need for constant modifications of the 
European treaties. 
• make the basic institutional structure more readable, more 
understandable and accessible to the public. 
• introduce a procedure for changes based, at least partly, on a form 
of majority voting, with intervention of the European Parliament. 
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3.3 Implementation 
Important preliminary work has been done on this subject, notably by the 
European University Institute in Florence. Drafts already exist indicating how 
such a division could be operated. The approach indicated by this report would 
therefore not cause undue delay. The Commission should mandate the 
European Institute to finalise its work, in co-operation with the legal services 
of the Council, the Commission and Parliament. This would clarify the debate 
and demonstrate the feasibility and the attraction of a reorganisation of treaty 
texts. The IGC, when convened, would then have a concrete proposal to serve 
as basis for negotiation if, as the group suggests, it decided to go down that 
road. 
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4. Defence 
The mandate of the group is clearly centred on institutional reform, and it has 
therefore abstained from suggestions of a different nature. But the fact is that 
the future IGC will not be working in a political vacuum. 
The declaration adopted by the European Council in Cologne on strengthening 
the common European policy on security and defence calls for important new 
steps. It wants the Council to have the ability to take decisions on the full 
range of conflict prevention and crisis management. This implies the 
development of a capacity for autonomous action backed up by credible 
military force. The European Council also wants the inclusion in the European 
Union of functions of the WEU The WEU as an organisation would then 
become redundant. These are major new initiatives, indicating a high level of 
ambition in the European Council and also with high visibility in public 
opinion. 
The date fixed for the complete implementation of this declaration is the same 
as that scheduled for the IGC: the end of 2000. 
Given this coincidence in timing, the pressing character and the paramount 
importance of the issue of European defence policy, the group believes that it 
cannot be ignored in the forthcoming IGC. This matter is of fundamental 
significance for the future of Europe and the development of the European 
Union. New institutional arrangements will be needed; they should fit in the 
single institutional :framework of the Union and not lead to the creation of a 
fourth pillar. Article 17 of the treaty on European Union offers some scope for 
the integration of W.E.U into the European Union without treaty change. 
Nevertheless treaty amendments may well be called for and should be dealt 
with in the IGC 
14 
Conclusion 
The forthcoming Intergovernmental Conference should aim at a comprehensive 
approach to institutional reform, including a reorganisation of the present treaties. 
Firstly because the two step approach envisaged by the protocol annex to the 
Amsterdam treaty has been overtaken by the broadening and acceleration of the 
accession process. Secondly because the issues described in the Cologne conclusions 
have implications going well beyond the specific subjects they describe. Thirdly 
because no better moment can be identified in the foreseeable future for the sort of 
institutional reform that an enlarged Union obviously requires. 
This reform can, and should, be negotiated in the course of next year, culminating in a 
substantial and comprehensive reform package agreed under the French presidency. 
This may seem a formidable challenge. The group believes that it can be met if the 
negotiating process is adapted in the light of previous experience, particularly that of 
the negotiation of the treaty of Amsterdam. 
As indicated in the report, the group believes that a draft proposal for treaty 
modifications could be put on the table at the start of the negotiations. It should draw 
on the discussions which took place in the course of the Amsterdam negotiations and 
on reflections which have been pursued since then, both within the institutions and in 
the academic world. It should combine ambition and realism. On this basis, a 
negotiation launched early in 2000 and pursued with a high level of political 
determination could very well culminate in a substantial reform package by the end of 
the year. 
This is indeed an ambitious goal but enlargement is a historical challenge of 
fundamental importance and serious difficulty, both for the Union and for candidate 
countries. At this crucial moment in its development the European Union should not 
lower its sights. It should rise to the challenge and formulate ambitions commensurate 
with that challenge. 
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